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Abstract. As a fundamental phenomenon in nature, randomness has a wide range of
applications in the fields of science and engineering. Among different types of random number
generators (RNG), quantum random number generator (QRNG) is a kind of promising RNG as
it can provide provable true random numbers based on the inherent randomness of fundamental
quantum processes. Nevertheless, the randomness from a QRNG can be diminished (or
even destroyed) if the devices (especially the entropy source devices) are not perfect or
ill-characterized. To eliminate the practical security loopholes from the source, source-
independent QRNGs, which allow the source to have arbitrary and unknown dimensions, have
been introduced and become one of the most important semi-device-independent QRNGs.
Herein a method that enables ultra-fast unpredictable quantum random number generation
from quadrature fluctuations of quantum optical field without any assumptions on the input
states is proposed. Particularly, to estimate a lower bound on the extractable randomness
that is independent from side information held by an eavesdropper, a new security analysis
framework is established based on the extremality of Gaussian states, which can be easily
extended to design and analyze new semi-device-independent continuous variable QRNG
protocols. Moreover, the practical imperfections of the QRNG including the effects of excess
noise, finite sampling range, finite resolution and asymmetric conjugate quadratures are taken
into account and quantitatively analyzed. Finally, the proposed method is experimentally
demonstrated to obtain high secure random number generation rates of 15.07Gbits/s in off-line
configuration and can potentially achieve 6 Gbits/s by real-time post-processing.
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1. Introduction
Random numbers are of extreme importance for a wide range of applications in both scientific
and commercial fields [1], such as numerical simulations, lottery games and cryptography. A
significant example is the quantum key distribution (QKD), in which the true random numbers
are essential for both quantum states preparation and detection to guarantee unconditional
security [2–4]. Classical pseudo random number generators (PRNG), which are based on the
computational algorithms, have been widely used in modern information systems. However,
due to the deterministic and thus predictable features of the algorithms, PRNG are not suitable
for certain applications where true randomness is required. Distinct from the PRNG, true
random number generators (TRNG) extract randomness from physical random processes [5].
An important type of TRNGs is the quantum random number generator (QRNG), which is
based on the intrinsic randomness of fundamental quantum processes and can provide truly
unpredictable and irreproducible random numbers [6–8].
The existing QRNG protocols can be mainly classified into three different categories as
in Ref. [7], i.e. the practical, device-independent and semi-device-independent QRNGs. Till
now, various practical QRNG protocols, which can realize a high random number generation
rate with relatively low cost [7], have been proposed and demonstrated, including measuring
photon path [9,10], photon arrival time [11–15], photon number distribution [16–19], vacuum
fluctuation [20–26], phase noise [27–37] and amplified spontaneous emission noise [38–42]
of quantum states. However, practical QRNGs can produce true random numbers with
information-theoretical provable security only if the randomness source and detection devices
are trusted and fulfill with the model assumptions, which usually fails in cases that the
devices are complex or controlled by eavesdroppers [7]. To avoid the defects, device-
independent (DI) QRNG, which can generate verifiable randomness without assumptions on
the source and measurement devices by observing the violation of Bell’s inequality, have been
proposed [43,44]. Although DI-QRNG protocols (including both randomness expansion [45–
48] and amplification [49, 50] protocols) have advantage of the self-testing randomness,
they are highly challenging in realistic implementations (e.g. not loss tolerant), and the
generation speed is usually too slow for practical applications [48]. Thus, QRNG protocol
with reasonable assumptions and high practical performance is meaningful and greatly
needed. To balance the performance and the security, the semi-device-independent QRNG
provides a trade-off between the practical and device independent QRNGs, where high speed
and low-cost informational provable randomness can be generated under several reasonable
assumptions without requiring trusted and complete model assumptions on all devices [7].
In general, there are two types of semi-device-independent QRNGs, namely, measurement-
device-independent (MDI) QRNG [51–53] and source-independent (SI) QRNG [54–57].
MDI-QRNG scenarios require untrusted measurement devices, whereas the source needs to
be well characterised. As a contrast, SI-QRNGs always assume that the entropy source is
unknown to users and thus totally untrusted, followed by a well modeled measurement device.
Particularly, as the quantum entropy source device is usually a complicated physical system in
practice and crucial for randomness generation, any deviations in the real-life implementation
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from its model assumptions may affect the output randomness [55]. Therefore, how to design
a QRNG protocol without any assumption on the source device become an important and
meaningful issue. To solve this problem, the first ideal of generating randomness with
unknown source was proposed in Ref. [54], which removes all the assumptions on the
source and the dimension of Hilbert space. Then the SI-QRNG protocols exploiting discrete-
variable method (based on measuring single photon path) [55] and continuous-variable
(CV) methods (based on vacuum fluctuation) [56, 57] were proposed and experimentally
verified, respectively, in which the output randomness can be certified even when the source
is completely uncharacterized and untrusted. These different protocols make SI protocols
competitive in implementations.
It is worth noting that, because of a totally unknown source employed in SI-QRNG
scenarios, a well-modeled detector is of significant importance. Recently, a model of coherent
detection to quantify randomness in a full quantum scenario is investigated [58]. This
technique can also be used to analyse the SI-QRNG protocols.
In this paper, a CV-SI-QRNG protocol, which requires no assumption on the source, is
proposed by measuring quadrature fluctuations of quantum optical field and experimentally
demonstrated. Compared to previous works where security analysis is based on entropic
uncertainty [56], we demonstrate a new method to estimate a lower bound on the extractable
randomness independent from classical or quantum side information held by an eavesdropper
(Eve) based on the extremality of Gaussian states [59]. The security analysis model shows
similarity to that of CV-QKD [60], where rich theoretical tools exist, and can be easily
extended to design and analyze new semi-device-independent CV-QRNG protocols, e.g.
semi-device-independent CV-QRNG protocols with different input states or measurements.
Furthermore, several practical issues of the protocol, including excess noise, finite detection
range and resolution are quantitively analyzed, and the optimal choices of experimental
parameters are discussed. It is shown that the proposed protocol is significantly resistant to
noise and loss, which can be realized with off-the-shelf commercial devices and enable ultra-
fast randomness generation rates. The final experimental secure random number generation
rates reach up to 15 Gbits/s in off-line configuration based on the proposed method, and have
potential to achieve 6 Gbits/s by real-time post-processing.
2. CV-SI-QRNG Protocol
A schematic of the proposed CV-SI-QRNG protocol is described as follows (as shown in
Fig. 1):
(i) Randomness Source Preparation: Eve prepares an untrusted and uncharacterized
source with quantum states ρA in arbitrary dimension, where Eve has access to a quantum
system E correlated with system A, and sends ρA to the balanced homodyne measurement
device of Alice.
(ii) Measurement: In one-shot experiment, Alice randomly measures the X quadrature
or the P quadrature of ρA to generate random bits, or randomly measure the X or the P
quadrature to check the purity of the input states, which is based on a random initial seed.
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Figure 1. (color online) Schematic of the proposed CV-SI-QRNG protocol.
The experiments are repeated in an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) way, until
ntot, the number of measurement results ai, are sufficient. We use nc to represent the number
of check samples out of total measurements, and use t to denote the length of the random
seed. The measurement is assumed to be trusted and well calibrated, and all the excess noise
is assumed to be introduced by a quantum correlated Eve as in Refs. [56, 60].
(iii) Parameter Estimation: The covariance matrix (CM) γA of ρA is estimated based on
Alice’s measurement results on quadratures X and P,
γA =
[
Vx c
c Vp
]
, (1)
where Vx and Vp are the variance of X and P quadratures, and c is the co-variance between X
and P quadratures for ρA.
(iv) Randomness Estimation and Extraction: Alice can extract asymptotically (ntot −
nc) (H(ai) − S (ai : E)) − t final randomness in ntot measurements by using informational
provable randomness extractor, such as Toeplitz-matrix hashing extractor, where H (ai) is
the Shannon entropy of Alice’s measurement results ai and S (ai : E) is the quantum mutual
information between Eve’s quantum state ρE and Alice’s measurement results ai.
In this protocol, no assumptions are made on the dimensions and purity of the input
states [56], which are difficult to verify experimentally. Indeed, it is typically difficult to
prepare and keep a real quantum system in a pure state. The detection is assumed to be
trusted and all the excess noise is due to a quantum correlated Eve, which shows similarity
with security analysis of CV-QKD and is the most conservative option [60]. In fact, the
method can also take into account the classical side information hold by Eve effectively as in
Refs. [23, 56].
3. Security Analysis
Suppose Alice’s homodyne detection is ideal (with infinite range and resolution), then the
measurement results of quadrature X for ρA is a continuous variable a. In the case of i.i.d.
assumption, the key rate in QKD is described by the Devetak-Winter formula [61], given by
K = β (I (a : b) − S (a : E)) , (2)
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where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(a : b) is the classical mutual information between
Alice’s and Bob’s data, and S (a : E) is the Holevo’s bound between Eve’s quantum state
ρE and Alice’s measurement results a, which is an upper bound of Eve’s quantum side
information. As a comparison, there are two different parts in QRNG scenarios comparing
with that of QKD scenarios. First, Alice and Bob are at the same station locally, namely
the “source station”, and second, there is no need to perform the information reconciliation.
The former leads to the reduction of the mutual information I(a : b) to the discrete Shannon
entropy (due to the fact that Alice actually gets a discrete variable ai in practical experiments),
and the later results in the reconciliation efficiency β = 1.
Note that in practice, Alice’s homodyne measurement is coarse-grained with imperfect
characteristics (e.g. finite range and resolution), thereby always modeled as the ideal
homodyne detection together with an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) with finite sampling
range, and thus the practical measurement procedure can be described as follows. First, Alice
utilizes an ideal homodyne detector to measure the quadrature of input states with continuous
output a following probability density distribution p(a), which cannot be read. Second, Alice
digitizes the continuous data a into n bits ai following probability distribution pdis(ai) by
an ADC with sampling range [−N + ∆/2,N − ∆3/2] and resolution n (see Appendix A for
details) [23], which is the actual output of a real-life homodyne detector. Upon measurement,
the continuous signal a is discretized into ai over 2
n bins with precision ∆ = N/2n−1.
Under the condition of practical measurements, it is easy to obtain the asymptotically
extractable randomness per measurement that uniform and uncorrelated from quantum side
information held by Eve, given by,
Rdis(ai|E) = H (ai) − S (ai : E) , (3)
where H(ai) is the Shannon entropy of discrete variable ai, and S (ai : E) is the Holevo’s
bound between Eve’s quantum state ρE and Alice’s measurement results ai. H(ai) can be
calculated easily based on Alice’s measurement results ai, while there are no direct way to
compute S (ai : E).
To get a lower bound for the extractable randomness, one needs to upper bound S (ai : E).
Fortunately, one can prove that
S (ai : E) ≤ S (a : E) , (4)
which indicates that local operation on one part of a state cannot increase the mutual
information between two parties (see Appendix B for detailed proofs). For further simplifying
the estimation of the upper bound of the Holevo’s information S (a : E), we assume Eve holds
a purification of the input state, namely, ρE = TrA{|ϕAE〉 〈ϕAE|}, which is optimal for Eve. In
that case, ρAE is a pure state, so the relations S (ρE) = S (ρA) and S (ρE |a) = 0 hold. Then one
has,
S (a : E) = S (ρE) −
∫
p (a) S
(
ρE|a
)
da = S (ρA), (5)
where p(a) is the probability density distribution of Alice’s measurement results, and ρE|a is
the quantum state held by Eve given that Alice’s measurement result is a.
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If the CM of ρA is known, one can prove that the von Neumann entropy of an arbitrary ρA
is upper bounded by that of a Gaussian state ρG
A
with the same CM based on the extremality
of Gaussian states [59], which means S (ρA) ≤ S
(
ρG
A
)
. Alternatively, one can verify that R fits
all the three conditions for Lemma 1 in Ref. [59], which also infers that R (ρA) ≥ R
(
ρG
A
)
given
a finite CM of ρA. In fact, the security of CV-QKD protocols against collective attacks have
been proved with similar methods [60]. Consequently, the lower bound of the extractable
randomness can be estimated based on the following relation:
Rdis(ai|E) ≥ H (ai) − S (a : E) ≥ H (ai) − S
(
ρGA
)
. (6)
The remaining question is how to upper bound S
(
ρG
A
)
given Alice’s digitized measurement
results ai. Due to the digitization process, we lose the information about the distribution of
a inside the discrete bins and outside the sampling range, thus one cannot calculate the exact
CM for ρA based on ai. However, given each ai corresponding to each continuous a with
known upper and lower bound, one can estimate an upper bound V x (V p) for the variance of
X (P) quadrature for ρA with a simple strategy (see Appendix C for details). Then,
S (ai : E) ≤ S (ρGA) ≤
λ + 1
2
log2
λ + 1
2
− λ − 1
2
log2
λ − 1
2
, (7)
where λ =
√
V xV p, and we set c = 0 to get the upper bound of λ.
In our protocol, the input state is expected (by Alice) to be a vacuum state if not disturbed
by Eve, while in fact it could be an arbitrary quantum state ρA prepared by Eve (e. g.
thermal state or squeezed state). Define the variance of vacuum fluctuation as σ2vac = 1 (all
the relevant quantities are normalized by vacuum fluctuation in the following). In practice,
the measurement results of quantum state are unavoidable mixed with excess noise ε (due to
classical or quantum side information held by Eve), which is the difference between measured
quadrature variance (σ2) and the expected vacuum fluctuation, i.e. ε = σ2 − 1. Define
the QCNR (quantum to classical noise ratio) as 10log10(1/ε). A typical example is that
σ2 = Vx = Vp = 1 + ε, due to a classical Eve that controls symmetric electronic noise
of the detection [23] or a quantum Eve that holds a purification of input state [56]. In this
case, Alice’s homodyne measurement results a on quadrature X (or P) is expected to be a
continuous variable following Gaussian distribution with variance σ2 and null mean value,
p (a) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− a
2
2σ2
)
. (8)
The corresponding CM of ρA is γA =
[
1 + ε 0
0 1 + ε
]
, with upper bounded
S (a : E) ≤ S
(
ρGA
)
=
(
ε
2
+ 1
)
log
(
ε
2
+ 1
)
− ε
2
log
ε
2
. (9)
Then, the corresponding probability distribution pdis(ai) after discrete sampling is
pdis(ai) =

1
2
er f c(N−0.5∆√
2σ
), i = imin
1
2
er f ( i+0.5√
2σ
∆) − 1
2
er f ( i−0.5√
2σ
∆), imin < i < imax
1
2
er f c(N−1.5∆√
2σ
), i = imax
(10)
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with imin = −2n−1 and imax = 2n−1 − 1. Then one can estimate the upper bounds of Vx, Vp
and S (ai : E) as in Appendix C. Note that the model in Eqs. (4) and (5) also fit with the
asymmetric quantum states (i.e. Vx , Vp).
In the above security analysis model, no assumptions are made on the input states, which
remove Eve’s side-information on source. Therefore, the extracted randomness is source
device loophole-free.
4. Practical issues and Numerical Simulations
The practical issues of the proposed QRNG protocol, such as sampling range N, precision n of
homodyne detection, excess noise ε and the squeeze factor r of the quantum state will directly
affect the performance of the protocol. Roughly speaking, the performance of the protocol
attains near optimal by setting N ∈ [3σ, 5σ] given fixed n and ε, increases (decreases) with n
(ε) given fixed N, and shows resistant to excess noise.
4.1. Effects of finite sampling range
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d
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Sampling range
(c)
Figure 2. (color online) Simulation results for (a) Shannon entropy H(ai) of Alice’s
measurement results, (b) upper bound of Eve’s information S (ai : E) and (c) extractable
quantum randomness Rdis(ai|E) as a function of sampling range N with resolution n =
2, 4, 8, 12 and 16, respectively. The probability distribution of ai is simulated by Eq. (11)
and H(ai) = −∑i=imaxi=imin pdis(ai)log2(pdis(ai)), based on which the upper bound of quadratures
variance V x (V p) for ρA is estimated. Then one has S (ai : E) ≤ λ+12 log2 λ+12 − λ−12 log2 λ−12 , λ =√
V xV p. The ideal case in (b) corresponds to the estimated upper bound of S (ai : E) when
N → ∞, n → ∞ as in Eq. (10). Finally, Rdis(ai|E) is estimated by Eqs. (8) and (9). The
excess noise is chosen to be ε = 0.1 and ρA is assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with
Vx = Vp = 1 + ε.
The finite sampling range will make us lose the information about probability distribution
of a outside the detection range, directly influence the measured probability distribution
pdis(ai) given p(a) (as in Appendix A), and thus affect the classical information H(ai) of
measurement results (as in Fig. 2(a)), the estimated upper bound V x (as in Appendix C) and
Eve’s information S (ai : E) (as in Fig. 2(b)). For a fixed resolution n, the effects of dynamical
sampling range N are:
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Figure 3. (color online) Simulation results for Shannon entropy H(ai) of Alice’s measurement
results, upper bound of Eve’s information S (ai : E) and extractable quantum randomness
Rdis(ai|E) as a function of resolution n with sampling range N = 5. The simulations of H(ai)
and S (ai : E) follows the same methods as in Fig. 2. The excess noise is chosen to be ε = 0.1
and ρA is assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with Vx = Vp = 1 + ε.
(i) If it is too small, the measurement outcomes become more predictable, and the Shannon
entropy will reduce dramatically as in Fig. 2(a) due to the oversaturated measurement results,
which will compromise both the rate and the security of the random number generation.
Meanwhile, one cannot estimate precisely the CM of the input states ρA, i.e. overestimate
the variance of a based on ai, thus overestimate Eve’s information S (ai : E) (as in Fig. 2(b)).
(ii) If it is chosen too large, most sampling bins will be unoccupied, and most measurement
results lie in central bins, which will reduce the extractable randomness.
Finally, the extractable randomness Rdis(ai|E) increases significantly with N when it is
small, and reduces slowly after the optimal choice of N as in 2(c). In practice, the absolute
value of N for an ADC dvice is usually fixed. However, one can control the relative value of
N in shot-noise-unit (SNU) by adjusting the amplification parameter of homodyne detection
(by controlling the power of LO or electronic amplifier). Usually, setting N ∈ [3σ, 5σ] in
SNU will attain performance close to the optimal strategy.
4.2. Effects of finite sampling resolution
The finite resolution n will make us lose the information about probability distribution of a
inside discrete intervals [(i − 1/2)∆, (i + 1/2)∆], i ∈ {−2n−1, ..., 2n−1 − 1} (as in Appendix A).
Given a fixed N, the larger the n, the more information can be got about a. It is clear that
the performance of the protocol will increase with resolution n as in Fig. 3. Given a fixed
sampling range N, the effects of resolution n are:
(i) If n is small (∆ is large), one cannot estimate precisely the CM of ρA (see Appendix C), thus
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overestimate the variance of quadratures for ρA and Eve’s information S (ai : E). Furthermore,
most measurement results lie in central bins (see Appendix A), which will reduce the Shannon
entropy significantly (almost linearly) as in Fig. 3.
(ii) The classical informationH(ai) increases almost lineally with n, while the estimated Eve’s
information reduces with n. As a result, the total extractable randomness will increase with n
(as in Fig. 3).
In practice, given a fixed N, one should choose a larger n to attain better performance.
4.3. Effects of excess noise
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Figure 4. (color online) Simulation results for upper bound of Eve’s information S (ai : E) as
a function of (a) excess noise and (b) QCNR, with n = 8 and N = 2, 5, 10, respectively. The
ideal case corresponds to the estimated upper bound of S (ai : E) when N → ∞, n → ∞. ρA is
assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with Vx = Vp = 1 + ε.
In our protocol, the detection is assumed to be trusted and well characterized, and all the
excess noise is due to a quantum correlated Eve. The excess noise or QCNR mainly decides
the correlation between Eve’s quantum state and Alice’s measurement results, which is a key
parameter in security analysis. It is clear that S (ai : E) increases (decreases) with ε (QCNR),
and one needs to choose proper N and n to get a tighter upper bound on S (ai : E). For a given
n, the optimal value N varies with different QCNR, as in Fig. 4. For given N and ε, one can
obtain a tighter bound of S (ai : E) with larger n, as in Fig. 5. Even when excess noise is much
larger than quantum noise, one still can get a tight bound on Eve’s information.
The final performance of the protocol is resistant against to the excess noise as shown
in Fig. 6. More surprisingly, even if the QCNR goes below 0 (e.g. -10 dB), that is,
excess noise due to Eve becomes larger than quantum noise, one can still obtain a nonzero
number of certified random bits that are independent of Eve’s side information. This means
one can use high bandwidth commercial balanced receivers which does not require the
receiver’s high QCNR (e.g. ≥ 10dB) as in former CV-QRNG experiment based on vacuum
fluctuation [20–22] or CV-QKD experiment, and thus dramatically increases the random
number generation rates.
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An interesting and important question is what is the relationship between the system
configuration and the maximal tolerable excess noise, or equivalently, the lowest QCNR that
still keeps the extractable randomness non-negative. Intuitively, no matter how low the QCNR
is, there is always some quantum randomness existing in the measurement results, which
can be extracted as long as the resolution n is high enough, i.e., at least to let the quantum
randomness part change one bit of the measurement result. Considering that the Gaussian
state extremality theorem and the assumption that Eve holds the purification of the whole
state are used to estimate Rdis (ai|E), it is natural to ‘imagine’ the whole state is a two-mode
squeezed state with variance σ2. In principle, Eve could provide X-squeezed states to Alice
to gain more advantage than vacuum states, due to its reduced variance V
sq
x = 1/σ
2, since the
final random bits are extracted only from the X-quadrature measurements. Thus, we predict
that, if the quantum randomness are contained in two or more bins, i.e., [−∆max,+∆max] ∈[
−3√V sqx ,+3√V sqx ] (→ ∆max ≤ kσ , k ≈ 3
)
, then Rdis (ai|E) will be non-negative.
We check the prediction numerically with conditions n = 8, 12, 16 and different QCNRs.
In Fig. 7 (a), Rdis (ai|E) with several typical QCNRs (−10dB,−20dB,−30dB) are shown, and
it is found k ≈ 3.05, which is almost the same for other different QCNRs (see the black solid
line in Fig. 7 (b)). However, if taking into consideration the modification of V x as in Appendix
C, it requires higher resolution n (smaller bin width ∆max, see the red dashed line in Fig. 7 (b)).
4.4. Effects of squeeze factor
In practice, the state prepared by Eve could not be a vacuum state with some excess noises,
but may be asymmetric between two quadratures x and p, which refers to the squeezed-state
case. We denote the squeeze factor by r as an example and the CM of ρA can be modified by
γA =
[
e−2r + ε 0
0 e2r + ε
]
, (11)
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Figure 5. (color online) Simulation results for upper bound of Eve’s information S (ai : E) as
a function of (a) excess noise and (b) QCNR, with N = 10 and n = 2, 4, 8, 16, respectively.
The ideal case corresponds to the estimated value of S (ai : E) when N → ∞, n → ∞. ρA is
assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with Vx = Vp = 1 + ε.
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Figure 6. (color online) Simulation results for extractable quantum randomness Rdis(ai|E)
as a function of QCNR with n = 4, 8, 12, 16, respectively. The sampling range is chosen
numerically optimally to be N = 3.3σ. ρA is assumed to be a symmetric Gaussian state with
Vx = Vp = 1 + ε.
where we assume that x is the squeezed quadrature with variance Vx = e
−2r + ε and p is the
anti-squeezed quadrature with variance Vp = e
2r + ε.
For simplification, we assume the anti-squeezed quadrature p is exploited to generate raw
key and both quadratures x and p are used for entropy estimation. In other words, the discrete
shannon entropy Hdis (ai) can be estimated by the data only from P-quadrature measurements,
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Figure 7. (color online) (a) Simulation results for extractable quantum randomness Rdis(ai|E)
as a function of k = ∆σ with n = 16 and QCNR= −10dB, −20dB, −30dB, respectively. Quiet
similar results are found for n = 8, 12. In the simulations, we ignore the effects of digitization
on estimation of CM to give an insight into the effect of parameter k. (b) The maximal allowed
resolution ∆max = k/σ for low QCNRs (≤ −10dB) with n = 16. Quiet similar results are found
for n = 8, 12. The effects of digitization on estimation of CM are ignored in black solid line
and considered in red dashed line.
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and meanwhile both data from X-quadrature measurements and P-quadrature measurements
are needed to estimate the upper bound S
(
ρG
A
)
. In order to estimate the upper bound of
two variances V x and V p as accurately as possible, and thus λ =
√
V xV p can be calculated
precisely, we set different sampling ranges Nx = 3σx and Np = 3σp for two quadrature
measurements to obtaining almost optimal performance.
We assume that Eve prepares squeezed states with practical feasible parameters as an
example, where the variances are Vx = 0.05 + ε and Vp = 20 + ε, referring to squeeze
factor of 13dB [62]. The performance of the asymmetric Gaussian state (squeezed state) is
shown in Fig. 8, and it is compared to the protocol using symmetric Gaussian state (vacuum
state). The estimation method of the asymmetric-state case is the same as the symmetric-state
case except for a small difference in the estimation of the upper bound of Eve’s information
S (ai : E), where two variances used in estimating λ are different.
Simulation results indicate that, the Shannon entropy Hdis(ai) of Alice’s measurement
results are the same under the same sampling bits, considering both symmetric-state case and
asymmetric-state case. However, because Eve’s information S (ai : E) under asymmetric-
state case is larger than that of symmetric-state case, the extractable randomness Rdis(ai|E)
of asymmetric-state case (red solid line) is a little smaller than that of symmetric-state case
(black dashed line). This result can be obtained directly by simplifying λ, which reads
λ2 = VxVp = 1 + ε
(
e−2r + e2r
)
+ ε2, (12)
and λ takes the minimum value when r is 0, which refers to the case of symmetric states
without squeezing operation. S (ai : E) is a monotonic incremental function about λ,
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Figure 8. (color online) Simulation results for extractable quantum randomness Rdis(ai|E),
Shannon entropy Hdis(ai) of Alice’s P-quadrature measurement results and upper bound of
Eve’s information S (ai : E) as functions of resolution n. The solid lines are the case of
symmetric Gaussian state (vacuum state) and the dashed lines are the case of asymmetric
Gaussian state (squeezed state with squeeze factor of 13dB). The excess noise is chosen to be
ε = 0.1.
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Figure 9. (color online) Experimental setup of the proposed CV-SI-QRNG. LO: local
oscillator, VOA: variable optical attenuator, PM: phase modular, BS: 50/50 beam splitter, VS:
vacuum state, BHR: balanced homodyne receiver, ADC: analog-to-digital converter. The CV-
QRNG is realized with off-the-shelves components.
which means that Eve’s amount of information is only minimal without squeezing and any
asymmetry of the quantum states ρA will decrease the final extractable randomness. The
result demonstrates that the QCNR of the squeezed quadrature is much smaller than that of
non-squeezed case, which will inevitable affect the estimation of the CM.
5. Off-line and Real-time Experimental Implementations and Performances
To validate the proposed protocol, a CV-SI-QRNG experimental setup is built based on
balanced homodyne receiver to measure the vacuum fluctuations as in Fig. 9. We implemented
an all-in-fiber setup with off-the-shelves devices. The local oscillator (LO) is a narrow line
1550 nm laser (Thorlabs SLF1550P, linewidth 50 KHz), and the LO power is carefully
adjusted to obtain the optimal performance. The 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) brings LO signal
interfered with the vacuum states to the balanced receiver (Thorlabs PDB480C, bandwidth
1.6GHz). The phase of LO is randomly shifted between 0 and pi/2 by a phase modulator
(PM) to realized the random sampling between X and P quadratures measurements, based on
an initial random seed t. Finally, the measurement results of the balanced receiver are sampled
in real-time by a 12-bit ADC (TI ADC12D1800, bandwidth 3.5GHz) with a sampling rate of
1.8G SPS to acquire the raw data, which is to be analyzed by the proposed model to extract
secure randomness.
To obtain optimal performance, the LO power is increased from 0 mW with a fixed step
of 0.5 mW and the voltage variance of the raw data corresponds to each LO power value is
calculated and recorded, which is shown in Fig. 10. In the region from 0 mW to 9.5 mW, the
variance of the sampled raw data enhances linearly with the increase of the LO power and the
peak value is observed at the LO power value of 10 mW due to the saturation of the balanced
homodyne receiver. The LO power is fixed at 10 mW in the experiment to obtain optimal
performance. The variance of the sampled raw data has a non-zero value even when the
LO power is turned off, which is generally attributed to the classical noise resulted from the
electromagnetic disturbance, the thermal fluctuations, the imperfection of the experimental
setup and even the manipulation of eavesdroppers. In practical implementation, the classical
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noise can hardly be eliminated and will also be sampled into the raw data, resulting in an
equivalently impure quantum states and impairing the randomness and security.
To measure the vacuum fluctuations with respect to the excess noise, the measurements
in the frequency domain have been performed by using an RF spectrum analyzer, which is
shown in Fig. 11. Two different spectra have been acquired: the vacuum fluctuations when
the LO power is 10 mW (red line) and the electrical noise when the LO power is turned
off (blue line). From the figure we can see that in the detected range, the power of vacuum
fluctuations is obviously higher than that of the electrical noise (the average gap between
them is about 8.37dB within 0∼1.6 GHz), which means the vacuum fluctuations dominate the
output and demonstrates the effectiveness of the detection.
We present the results obtained on a typical run of ntot = 2.6214 × 109 data samples.
The corresponding measured shot noise variance is 5.5572×10−4 V2, excess noise variance is
6.31 × 10−5 V2, and the total measurement results variance of X quadratures is 6.1182 ×
10−4 V2. In SNU, the variance of the pure vacuum state is normalized to 1, while the
experimentally measured X quadrature variance is σ2 = 1.1135 as shown in Fig. 12. As
mentioned above, the deviation is mainly resulted from the classical noise in our experiment,
which cannot be separated from the vacuum fluctuations in measurement results, leading
to the impurity of the sampled raw data and the potential impairment of the security. The
sampling range N = 21.2098 = 20.0998σ and excess noise ε = 0.1135 in SNU, and
the resolution n = 12. The estimated upper bound V x = 1.1218 and V p = 1.1220 in
real experiment with the methods in Appendix C (the corresponding theoretical simulation
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Figure 10. (color online) Variance vs LO power. This figure shows the voltage variance of the
sampled raw data as a function of the LO power. In the region from 0mW to 9.5 mW, it shows a
relatively clear linearity between the voltage variance and the sampled raw data. While the LO
power increases higher than 9.5 mW, the detection and amplification in the balanced receiver
starts to saturate, resulting in the decrease of the linearity, and the peak value of the voltage
variance is obtained at 10 mW.
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Figure 11. (color online) The power spectal density of the vacuum fluctuations when the LO
power is 10mW (red line) and the electrical noise when the LO power is turned off (blue line).
Within the detected frequency range, the vacuum fluctuations dominate in terms of the power.
results based on our model is V x = V p = 1.1223 for both quadratures under Gaussian
assumption as in Eq. (11)). The experimental estimation and corresponding theoretical
simulation of Shannon entropy, von Neumann entropy and extractable randomness are
H(ai) = 8.7117(Exp)/8.7180(Theo), S (ρ
G
A
) = 0.3366(Exp)/0.3373(Theo) and Rdis(ai|E) =
8.3751(Exp)/8.3807(Theo), respectively. Furthermore, the number of bits necessary for the
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Figure 12. (color online) The probability distribution of the ideal pure vacuum state (black
line), the probability distribution of the ADC sampled raw data (blue line) in shot-noise-unites
and the fitted distribution for raw data (red line).
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switching between the two quadratures must be accounted. Following [56], we set nc=
√
ntot.
Out of the ntot measurements, the check instants can be chosen in
(
ntot
nc
)
different ways,
which can be encoded in a seed t =
⌈
log2
ntot!
nc!(ntot−nc)!
⌉
bits long. The final secure generation rate,
i.e. true random bits per measurement, is
Rsec =
1
ntot
[(ntot − nc)(H(ai) − S (ai : E)) − t] . (13)
Given ntot = 2.6214 × 109, we employed nc = 5.12 × 104 bits to evaluate the extractable
randomness, and t = 8.7482×105. In our experiments, the corresponding secure rate of every
measurement is Rsec = 8.3746 bits with sampling rate 1.8G SPS, which indicates an equivalent
secure bit generation rate of 15.07 Gbits/s. The final generated random bits sequences have
passed all the NIST and DIEHARD tests. It should note that, Eq. (13) strictly holds under
the asymptotic-limit case, where the total block size ntot tends to infinity. Therefore our
randomness generation rate is, rigorously speaking, a asymptotic rate without considering the
finite-size effect, which will lead to a bias in estimating the CM γA, resulting in the estimation
of S (ai : E) deviating from the asymptotic-limit case. We leave the finite-size analysis of the
randomness extraction for future investigations.
For the real-time implementation, we have also developed a parallel algorithm of Toeplitz
hashing post-processing method on the field programmable gate array (FPGA) recently
[63]. The FPGA-based hardware can support our system to achieve a generation rate of 6
Gbits/s under the existing hardware conditions, which is important for the fields requiring
immediately available random numbers.
6. Conclusion and Discussion
We have proposed and experimentally demonstrated a CV-SI-QRNG protocol even if the
source is untrusted or controlled by Eve. Based on the extremality of Gaussian states, a
new theoretical model to estimate the lower bound on the extractable quantum randomness
is established, which is similar to the security analysis of CV-QKD. The protocol is resistant
to classical noise and losses (can be easily compensated by increasing LO power), which
is beneficial for practical applications. The random numbers are sampled in real-time by
a dedicated ADC hardware rather than oscilloscope [56], which is beneficial to a practical
QRNG design. We experimentally demonstrate the protocol with commercial devices, and the
final secure random number generation rates reach up to 15 Gbits/s in off-line and 6 Gbits/s
in real-time respectively, and shows feasibility of the protocol with an ultra-fast, cheap and
compact CV-QRNG. By using high bandwidth commercial balanced receivers and fast LO
phase shifter, the secure generation rate can be increased to tens of Gbits/s.
The finite-size analysis should be investigated in further research, where one can use
the fruitful theoretical tools built in CV-QKD [64]. The SI-QRNG protocol proposed here
is actually a CV-QKD protocol with a trivial sender, who always sends the vacuum state.
Therefore, one can follow the same universal composable framework (UCF) in Ref. [65–68].
However, the finite-size analyze of SI-QRNG has two main differences with CV-QKD under
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UCF, i.e., no need for error correction, and only one parameter is statistically counted and
tested in parameter estimation test. The core of finite-size analysis is to evaluate Eve’s
information about the measured random bit sequence, represented by a quantity of smooth
min-entropy Hε
′
min
(a
nQ
i
|E)ρnQ that varies with data block size. Moreover, the comparison
between our protocol and the protocol given in Ref. [56] is a very interesting and important
topic, which needs to be further studied considering the practical issues, such as the finite-size
effect, the finite sampling resolution and range of the detector.
Furthermore, in this paper, the LO power is assumed to be constant and fixed and
security analysis against the LO power fluctuation needs to be further investigated. In our
lab experiment, the LO power is relatively stable. However, in practical application, it could
be influenced by the environment or even by Eve.
Note added. Recently, an independent work has been published in Ref. [57]. This work
also proposed a new analysis method for SI-QRNG, which also has experimentally achieved
a high generation rate.
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant
No. 61771439, 61501414, 61702469, 61602045, 61531003), National Cryptography
Development Fund (Grant No. MMJJ20170120), Sichuan Youth Science and Technology
Foundation(Grant No. 2017JQ0045), Foundation of Science and Technology on
Communication Security Laboratory (Grant No. 6142103040105), China Postdoctoral
Science Foundation (Grant No. 2018M630116).
Appendix A. Model of coarse-grained homodyne measurement
We model Alice’s real-life coarse-grained homodyne measurement process into two steps.
Firstly, Alice uses an ideal homodyne detector to measure the quadrature of input states with
continuous output a following probability distribution p(a), which cannot be read. Secondly,
Alice digitizes the continuous variable a into n digitized bits ai following probability
distribution pdis(ai) by an ADC with sampling range N and resolution n [23, 56], which is
the actual output of a real-life homodyne detector. To be precise, Alice digitizes the data a
between [−N+∆/2,N−∆3/2] into 2n equal intervals with bin width ∆ = N/2n−1. The range is
chosen so that the central bin is centered at zero. The central value of each interval represents
the digitized results, while for data smaller than −N or greater than N it will be the smallest
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and the largest digitized value. Then, one has,
ai =

a−2n−1 ≡ −N a < −N + ∆/2
a−2n−1+1 ≡ −N + ∆ −N + ∆/2 ≤ a < −N + 3∆/2
a−2n−1+2 ≡ −N + 2∆ −N + 3∆/2 ≤ a < −N + 5∆/2
...
...
a0 ≡ 0 −∆/2 ≤ a < ∆/2
a1 ≡ ∆ ∆/2 ≤ a < 3∆/2
...
...
a2n−1−3 ≡ N − 3∆ N − 7∆/2 ≤ a < N − 5∆/2
a2n−1−2 ≡ N − 2∆ N − 5∆/2 ≤ a < N − 3∆/2
a2n−1−1 ≡ N − ∆ a ≥ N − 3∆/2
, (A.1)
where i ∈
{
−2n−1, . . . , 2n−1 − 1
}
. The probability distribution pdis(ai) reads,
pdis(ai) =

−N+∆/2
∫
−∞
p (a) da i = imin
ai+∆/2
∫
ai−∆/2
p (a) da imin < i < imax
+∞
∫
N−3∆/2
p (a) da i = imax
(A.2)
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Figure A1. (color online) Simulation results of the probability distribution pdis(ai) of Alice’s
measurement results ai with different sampling range N = 2σ, 5σ, 8σ and 100σ by Eq. (A4)
under Gaussian assumption. The resolution is fixed to be n = 8 and the excess noise is chosen
to be ε = 0.1.
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Figure A2. (color online) Simulation results of the probability distribution pdis(ai) of Alice’s
measurement results ai with different resolution n = 2, 4, 8 and 16 by Eq. (A4) under
Gaussian assumption. The sampling range is fixed to N = 5 and the excess noise is chosen to
be ε = 0.1.
Suppose a follows Gaussian distribution with variance σ2 = 1 + ε and null mean value,
p (a) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(
− a
2
2σ2
)
, (A.3)
which is a typical result in vacuum fluctuation measurement. Then,
pGdis(ai) =

1
2
er f c(N−0.5∆√
2σ
), i = imin
1
2
er f ( i+0.5√
2σ
∆) − 1
2
er f ( i−0.5√
2σ
∆), imin < i < imax
1
2
er f c(N−1.5∆√
2σ
), i = imax
(A.4)
Simulation results of the probability distribution pdis(ai) with different sampling range
and fixed resolution are shown in Fig. A1. It is shown that ai becomes more predictable when
N is too small (or large) due to the oversaturated (or unoccupied) measurement results, which
will reduce the extractable randomness.
Simulation results of the probability distribution pdis(ai) with different resolution and
fixed sampling range are shown in Fig. A2. If it is small, most measurement results lie in
central bins, which will reduce the Shannon entropy dramatically. The larger the resolution,
the better the extractable randomness.
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Appendix B. S (ai : E) ≤ S (a : E)
Suppose Alice’s measurement results of an ideal and a coarse-grained homodyne
measurement on X quadratures of quantum state ρA are a and ai (as in Appendix A),
respectively, and denote the corresponding quantum state hold by Eve is ρE|a and ρE|ai ,
respectively. Then one has
ρE =
∫
p (a) ρE|ada, (B.1)
and
ρE|ai =

−N+ 1
2
∆∫
−∞
p(a)
pdis(ai)
ρE|ada i = imin
ai+
1
2
∆∫
ai− 12∆
p(a)
pdis(ai)
ρE|ada imin < i < imax
+∞∫
N− 3
2
∆
p(a)
pdis(ai)
ρE|ada i = imax
(B.2)
Note that p(a) is unknown to Alice. Thus, the total system is assumed to be
ρdis
AE
=
i=imax∑
i=imin
pdis (ai) |ai〉 〈ai| ⊗ ρE|ai (B.3)
One can easily verify that the overall state of Eve is the same as the ideal case,
ρdisE = tr(ρ
dis
AE
) = tr(ρAE) = ρE. (B.4)
Using Holevo’s bound, one has
I (ai : E) ≤ S (ai : E) = S
(
ρdisE
)
−
i=imax∑
i=imin
pdis (ai) S
(
ρE|ai
)
. (B.5)
Using the concavity of the von Neumann entropy,
S
(
ρE|ai
)
= S

ai+
1
2
∆∫
ai− 12∆
p (a)
pdis (ai)
ρE|ada
 ≥
ai+
1
2
∆∫
ai− 12∆
p (a)
pdis (ai)
S (ρE|a)da, (B.6)
(similar for i = imin and imax). Then, one can get
I (ai : E) ≤ S (ai : E) = S
(
ρdis
E
)
− i=imax∑
i=imin
pdis (ai) S
(
ρE|ai
)
≤ S (ρE) −
∞∫
−∞
p (a) S
(
ρE|a
)
da = S (E : a)
(B.7)
Qualitatively speaking, the digitization process can have a corresponding quantum operation
acting only on Alice’s side, while the operation conducting only on one part of the state can
not increase the mutual information between two parties.
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Appendix C. Effects of digitization on estimation of CM
The upper bound of S (ρA) for ρA can be calculated by considering it is a Gaussian state with
the same CM using Gaussian extremality theorem. The real CM for ρA should be estimated
through Alice’s ideal detection result a, which is continuous, noted by
γA =
(
Vx c
c Vp
)
, (C.1)
with symplectic eigenvalue λ =
√
det(γA) =
√
VxVp − c2, where Vx, Vp and c are real
numbers. The von Neumann entropy of a Gaussian state with CM γA is
S (ρGA) =
λ + 1
2
log2
λ + 1
2
− λ − 1
2
log2
λ − 1
2
≥ S (ρA). (C.2)
To estimate the upper bound of S (ρG
A
), one only needs to upper bound the symplectic
eigenvalue, which is equivalent to upper bound Vx and Vp, lower bound c
2.
In ideal digitization with infinite sampling range, the upper bound of Vx(Vp) is easy
to get, since each unknown a is upper and lower bounded by its digitization interval, i.e.,
ai − 12∆ ≤ a ≤ ai + 12∆. Therefore, for ai ≤ 0 we use ai − 12∆, and for ai > 0 we
use ai +
1
2
∆ to calculate Vx, which is an upper bound. However, in a real system, the
digitization has finite sampling range. For asymptotic case, an extra energy test is needed
for the most rigorous proof. For a approximate but more practical solution, we can set a
relatively large bound [−alim, alim], in which the probability of the case a < [−alim, alim] is
negligible. For example, for a Gaussian distributed a with variance σ2, if alim = 10σ, then
Pr [a < [−alim, alim]] < 1.5×10−23; and if alim = 100σ, then Pr [a < [−alim, alim]] < 5.5×10−89.
Considering more general cases, the measurement results are in the interval [amin, amax] with
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Figure C1. (color online) The simulation results for upper bound of quadratures variance V x
(V p) for ρA based on Alice’s digitized measurement results as a function of sampling range
N with resolution n = 2, 4, 8, 16, respectively. The ideal case corresponds to the estimated
value of Vx when N → ∞, n → ∞. The excess noise is chosen to be ε = 0.1.
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Figure C2. (color online) The simulation results for upper bound of quadratures variance
V x for ρA based on Alice’s digitized measurement results as a function of resolution n and
range N = 5, 10, respectively. The ideal case corresponds to the estimated value of Vx when
N → ∞, n → ∞. The excess noise is chosen to be ε = 0.1.
non-zero mean a¯. We use ai (i ∈ [imin, 0)) to represent the results which are smaller than the
mean value, and ai (i ∈ (0, imax]) denotes the results which are larger than the mean. The Vx is
upper bounded by the following quantity with high confidence level,
V x = pdis
(
aimin
)
(amin − a¯)2 + pdis (aimax) (amax − a¯)2 (C.3)
+
0∑
i=imin+1
pdis (ai)
(
ai − a¯ − 1
2
∆
)2
+
imax−1∑
i=+1
pdis (ai)
(
ai − a¯ + 1
2
∆
)2
.
Similarly, one can upper bound the variance of P quadrature with the same methods,
V p ≥ Vp. For simplicity, we set c = 0 to upper bound Eve’s information. Finally, the upper
bound of the symplectic eigenvalue for ρA is λ =
√
V xV p, and
S (ρA) ≤ λ + 1
2
log2
λ + 1
2
− λ − 1
2
log2
λ − 1
2
. (C.4)
The effects of sampling range N and resolution n on estimated upper bound of quadrature
variance is shown in Fig. C1 and Fig. C2, respectively. Generally, one can get a tighter upper
bound V x by increasing n. When N < 3σ, one will overestimate the variance of a based on
measurement results ai, which will significantly overestimate Eve’s information.
For the finite-size case, we can choose a relatively large sampling range N, and set the
bound of energy test within [−N,N]. And we further require that even if only one digitized
data exceeds the energy test bound, the energy test for the whole block fails. Therefore, for
all the data blocks that pass the energy test, the upper bound of the estimated Vx can be got
through the same strategy as above. For the data blocks fail the energy test, this round of
the protocol aborts. One should note that, the sampling range should be carefully chosen, if
it’s too small, too many blocks will fail; if it’s too large, the estimated parameter will be too
High Speed Continuous Variable Source-Independent QuantumRandomNumber Generation 23
pessimistic.
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